The Supreme Court reversed the lower rulings, focusing on three core issues:

• Equal Division Presumption: The Court held that the family court erred by interpreting Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 403.190 through a lens that presumed an equal 50-50 division of marital assets. Reaffirming precedent like Herron v. Herron, the Court stressed that there is no legal presumption of an equal split; trial courts must rigorously evaluate statutory factors to divide property in "just proportions" without engaging in unwarranted statutory construction.
• Post-Separation Property: The Court affirmed that assets and equity acquired between physical separation and a formal dissolution decree are generally marital property unless an exception under KRS 403.190(2) applies (such as a legal separation decree). However, because the overarching property division analysis was flawed by the equal-split presumption, the specific distribution of post-separation assets must also be re-evaluated.
• Spousal Maintenance: The Court underscored that under KRS 403.200(1), a court must affirmatively find that a spouse lacks sufficient property—explicitly including apportioned marital property—to meet reasonable needs before awarding maintenance. Because the property division was vacated, Roger's maintenance award must be reassessed on remand.

Two justices dissented, arguing that the family court's equal division was a valid exercise of discretion and that its references to legislative intent were harmless surplusage. The case was remanded to the family court for further proceedings consistent with the majority opinion.

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In September 2022, the child's second cousin and her husband filed a petition to adopt the child, who had been in their custody since a prior dependency, neglect, and abuse action stemming from the natural parents' substance misuse and failure to follow case plans. Although the trial court initially granted the adoption, the Court of Appeals previously reversed and remanded the case, instructing the lower court to make specific factual findings connecting the evidence to the statutory conditions under KRS 199.502.

Following remand, the trial court entered amended findings detailing the natural mother’s ongoing substance misuse struggles, inconsistent visitation, and failure to provide meaningful financial support—noting she provided only a single payment of one thousand dollars over a thirty-eight-month period despite having the resources to plan a wedding.

The trial court concluded that the adoptive parents proved by clear and convincing evidence that three statutory conditions for adoption without consent were met: abandonment, failure to provide essential parental care, and failure to provide necessary financial support under KRS 199.502(1). Reviewing the case under a clearly erroneous standard, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court fully complied with the remand instructions and that substantial evidence supported the findings under subsection (e) regarding essential parental care. Because only one statutory condition is required, the appellate court affirmed the adoption judgment without needing to address the remaining subsections.

Case Background

Grandfather refused to let his son and the child's homeless mother stay at his home because of suspected drug intoxication. When Grandfather arrived at his residence, an altercation ensued after Father demanded entry, balled his fists, and violently attacked Grandfather—strangling him and breaking his jaw on both sides. To protect himself, Grandfather drew his handgun and shot Father in the leg, with a bullet fragment also striking the mother.

While the Commonwealth attorney declined to prosecute Grandfather because he acted in self-defense, the Cabinet for Health and Family Services filed a dependency, neglect, or abuse petition naming Grandfather as responsible. The family court ruled that Grandfather committed abuse and neglect, reasoning that he had a duty to retreat, should not have brought the child into the situation, and created a risk of physical and emotional injury by firing a gun.

The Appellate Ruling

The Court of Appeals reversed the family court's decision, holding that the finding of abuse was unsupported by substantial evidence. The appellate court emphasized:

• Self-Defense vs. DNA Proceedings: While a prosecutor's self-defense determination is not automatically dispositive in a civil dependency, neglect, and abuse (DNA) case, it remains critical context.
• Speculative Hindsight: The family court's ruling relied on a speculative theory of how Grandfather should have acted. The record lacked evidence showing Grandfather could have safely fled with the child without provoking a violent reaction from Father.
• Lack of Culpability: Grandfather was the victim of a vicious, unprovoked attack and appropriately defended himself. He bore no blame for the resulting trauma or emotional injury to the child.